Gerasimov fell short of expectations. Who will Putin trust to lead the war against Ukraine?
Who will conduct the Russian mobilization and take responsibility for the ruined tourist season in Crimea and the regular strikes on rear cities? Frontliner investigated the likelihood of a new commander-in-chief emerging for the Russian forces in Ukraine, along with the dossiers of Gerasimov's potential successors, to explain how Russia may continue to wage the war and whether to expect a winter offensive.
The commander-in-chief of the Russian forces in Ukraine has been replaced only once, in January 2023. The dismissal of Sergei Surovikin was a direct result of the Russian military withdrawal from the Kherson region, a lack of major victories, and, most importantly, his loyalty to Prigozhyn’s Wagner Group. The loss of Vladimir Putin’s trust and the need to find a scapegoat for military failures are the primary drivers behind the dismissals of high-ranking Russian officials. Replacing Gerasimov would indirectly reflect the operational state of Russia’s military-political machine during a protracted war. Furthermore, during the Russian State Duma elections, Gerasimov’s dismissal could be used as an additional PR boost for the United Russia party to demonstrate a readiness for change.
Why talk of replacing Gerasimov has emerged
Russian propagandists attempt to present the appointments and dismissals of high-ranking officials as calculated and planned to project the stability of the system. Such decisions are often masked by existing legal norms, which are always open to various interpretations. According to Article 49 of the Russian federal law “On Military Duty and Military Service,” 70 is the maximum age limit for generals, after which an officer must retire. Dismissal due to age limits provides a convenient opportunity for the political system to rotate leadership within the military elite.
However, figures loyal to the Russian president can unlock a premium feature: contract extensions via presidential decree. Thanks to this loophole, the 70-year-old commander-in-chief of Rosgvardiya, Viktor Zolotov, and the 71-year-old director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Sergei Naryshkin, have remained in office. In September 2026, Gerasimov will turn 71. The Russian age law is certainly not an obstacle to his continued service, but the main question is whether Putin has a reason and a candidate for the replacement. The failure of the spring-summer offensive in Ukraine, systematic strikes by the Ukrainian Defense Forces on Russian rear cities, and the need for active mobilization could theoretically serve as reasons. But who could possibly replace Gerasimov?
Who the Kremlin factions are backing
The “Party of War”: Z-bloggers and military correspondents
This network traditionally promotes frontline commanders with combat experience. The primary candidate is career military officer Andrei Mordvychev. In the Russo-Ukrainian War, he gained notoriety for his role in the capture of Mariupol and the seizure of Avdiivka, for which he received the Hero of Russia award. In 2025, he became the commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces and later took the position of First Deputy Commander of the Joint Grouping of Russian Forces in Ukraine. During the Russian Zapad-2025 military exercises, Mordvychev appeared at the training ground alongside the Russian president instead of Gerasimov. In the media, military correspondents support Andrei Mordvychev and have touted him as the next commander-in-chief for several years.
However, Vladimir Putin keeps him at a distance because he does not fully trust him. Despite effectively executing the core tasks and planning for the Russo-Ukrainian War, Mordvychev remains removed from political maneuvering. Alongside him, military correspondents are also promoting the commander of the Airborne Forces, Colonel General Mikhail Teplinskiy, whom the military correspondent community describes as a “reliable combat commander.” In this case, however, Teplinskiy is in no rush to take the position, as, being a career military officer, he understands the risks and responsibility involved.
According to analysts, the group aligned with the Minister of Defense and technocrat Andrii Bielousov is pushing for Aleksandr Chaiko. In 2022, this Colonel General of the Russian Aerospace Forces commanded the “Vostok” grouping, which was involved in the torture and mass murder of civilians in Bucha. Furthermore, he is known as the “funeral” general. On August 1, 2026, during his birthday celebration at the high-priced Italian restaurant Balzi Rossi, an explosion occurred, killing a bodyguard, an unidentified woman who had brought the explosives, and General Teplinskiy. Aleksandr Chaiko is described as the most suitable candidate due to his experience in Syria and his ability to navigate the internal politics of the General Staff. Both traits are essential components of a military career in the Russian Federation.
The Siloviki and Kadyrov
This group values loyalty and the stability of the administrative vertical, so they are working to extend Gerasimov’s tenure through that very same presidential decree.
Ramzan Kadyrov’s group is lobbying for the commander of the Akhmat special forces unit, Lieutenant General Apti Alaudinov. He proposed temporarily reinstating the death penalty in the Russian Federation so that Ukrainian Armed Forces prisoners of war could face capital punishment in a tribunal after the Russo-Ukrainian War ends. He is also known for his book “The Army of Jesus in the Fight Against the Dajjal Antichrist,” his threats to Trump, and his readiness to destroy the “American anarchist army” in Iran. He is a notorious and abrasive figure, therefore a liability to the Kremlin. While he serves as a leader for far-right radicals, he lacks the trust of dictator Putin.
Another candidate under consideration is Colonel General Sergei Kuzovliev, commander of the “Zapad” grouping. It was he who reported the “successful” capture of Kupiansk in November 2025, for which he received a Gold Star from Putin. He currently commands the Moscow Military District, bringing him closer to the central military apparatus. His combat experience in Syria, active participation in the Russo-Ukrainian War since 2014, and his ability to lie and fabricate victories make him a likely successor to Gerasimov.
Future Scenarios
Despite sustained public criticism of his actions, Gerasimov remains in office. One reason is the lack of a loyal candidate who is not simultaneously affiliated with a specific Kremlin faction. Another reason is that Kremlin influence groups cannot propose a suitable candidate and lack sufficient leverage over the Russian president. Moreover, extending Gerasimov’s tenure creates a false sense of “stability,” preserves the appearance of a system under control, and gives little cause for speculation about discord in the Kremlin. Therefore, one of the most likely scenarios is keeping Gerasimov in his position while further diluting his authority among other operational commanders and ministers. Gerasimov will be left with the role of the main culprit for Russia’s defeat in the war against Ukraine in the eyes of the Russian public, although for now, this blame has been postponed.
What this means for Ukraine
For Ukraine, keeping Gerasimov in office would mean that the current model of warfare will persist, with no drastic tactical changes. This includes slow pressure on specific sectors of the front, regular shelling of rear cities, and the absence of risky offensive operations throughout the winter. This approach aligns with the Kremlin’s cautious and conservative approach to personnel decisions and its broader strategy of waging a prolonged war of attrition.
